Moral as well as religious freedom
Here is the position for which I argue: Moral freedom-the freedom to live one's life in accord with one's moral convictions and commitments-merits protection as a human right 3 no less than religious freedom, which is the freedom to live one's life in accord with one's religious convictions and commitments. (For one who self-identifies as religious, there may be an overlap between the two freedoms, because for such a person, some of her moral convictions and commitments may be based on her religious convictions and commitments.) The right to religious and moral freedom protects the freedom to live one's life in accord with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments. The articulation of the right in article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 4 is canonical, in this sense: The great majority of the countries of the world-about 87 percent-are parties to the ICCPR, including, as of 1992, the United States.
5
Of course, the protection afforded by the right to religious and moral freedom isand as a practical matter, it must be-only conditional protection; the protection is not absolute (unconditional) . Under the right, government may not ban or otherwise impede conduct protected by the right, thereby interfering with one's freedom to live one's life in accord with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments, unless, as I have explained elsewhere, 6 each of three conditions is satisfied:
• The legitimacy condition. The government action at issue (law, policy, etc.) must serve a legitimate government objective. The specific government action at issue might be not the law (policy, etc.) itself but that the law does not exempt the protected conduct.
• The least burdensome alternative condition. The government action-which, again, might be that the law does not exempt-must be necessary to serve the legitimate objective, in the sense that the action serves the objective significantly better than would any less burdensome government action.
• The proportionality condition. The legitimate objective served by the government action must be sufficiently weighty to warrant the burden imposed by the government action.
It bears emphasis that the position for which I argue-the position that Professor Domingo rejects-is not idiosyncratic. 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. In the conclusion to their book, Taylor and Maclure write: "There do not seem to be any principled reasons to isolate religion and place it in a class apart from the other conceptions of the world and of the good." 9 I concur in Taylor and Maclure's conclusion. To prevent one from living one's life in accord with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments, or to make it significantly more difficult for one to do so, is hurtful, sometimes greatly hurtful. 19, 2013 , http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/claims-conscience. As the work cited in the preceding paragraph illustrates-and indeed as this essay illustrates-one need not rely on Leiter's argument to support the conclusion that, in MacluRe & tayloR's articulation, "[t]here do not seem to be any principled reasons[, for purposes of freedom of conscience,] to isolate religion and place it in a class apart from the other conceptions of the world and of the good" (supra note 7, at 105).
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MaRk R. wicclaiR, conscientious obJection in health caRe: an ethical analysis 11 (2011). See also Sapir & Statman, supra note 9, at 474: "[C]oercing people to act against their deepest normative beliefs presents a severe threat to their integrity and makes them experience strong feelings of self-alienation and loss of identity; therefore, it should be avoided as far as possible."
[A] loss of moral integrity can be devastating. It can result in strong feelings of guilt, remorse, and shame as well as loss of self-respect. Moral integrity can be of central importance to people whose core beliefs are secular as well as those whose core beliefs are religious. [Martha] Nussbaum cites a powerful image that Roger Williams used to defend liberty of conscience: "To impose an orthodoxy upon the conscience is nothing less than what Williams, in a memorable and oft-repeated image, called 'Soule rape'." The reference to rape of the soul suggests that this statement was meant primarily as a defense of religious tolerance. Nevertheless, when a failure to accommodate secular core beliefs results in a loss of moral integrity, it can be experienced as an assault on one's self or identity.
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The legitimacy condition
Why does Professor Domingo reject as unsound the position that moral freedom should be protected alongside religious freedom as a human right? In this brief "Reply to Rafael Domingo," I want to comment on a fundamental aspect of Professor Domingo's argument.
Recall the three conditions that government must satisfy under the right to religious and moral freedom: the legitimacy condition, the least restrictive alternative condition, and the proportionality condition. It is the first of the three conditions-the legitimacy condition-that marks the principal divide, I think, between Professor Domingo and me.
Professor Domingo writes that a political community, properly understood, is not a religious community, but that a political community, properly understood, is a moral community. Because it is not a religious community, a political community, reasons Professor Domingo, can be agnostic about religious questions and should, for various reasons, protect religious freedom. Professor Domingo places great emphasis on the fact that because a political community is a moral community, a political community cannot be agnostic about moral questions.
I agree with Professor Domingo that a political community, properly understood, is a moral community. Indeed, a liberal democracy, properly understood, is a political community committed to certain moral rights, which we conventionally refer to as human rights. One of those rights, I have argued elsewhere, is the right to religious and moral freedom.
12 Although a political community cannot be agnostic about-and a liberal democracy is not agnostic about-all moral questions, a political community can be-and, under the right to religious and moral freedom, a liberal democracy should be-agnostic about some moral questions, such as the question whether the use of contraceptives by a married couple is immoral.
13 Let me explain. "Protecting public morals" is undeniably a legitimate government objective under the right to religious and moral freedom. The canonical articulation of the rightarticle 18 of the ICCPR-explicitly says so.
14 However, if in banning or otherwise impeding conduct purportedly in pursuit of that objective, government is acting based on-"based on" in the sense that government would not be regulating the conduct "but for"-either a religious belief that the conduct is immoral or a sectarian nonreligious belief that the conduct is immoral, government is not truly acting to protect public morals. It is, instead, acting to protect sectarian morals, and protecting sectarian morals is not a legitimate government objective under the right to religious and moral freedom.
Again, establishing and protecting the right to religious and moral freedom is a principal response to what Maclure and Taylor have identified as " [o] ne of the most important challenges facing contemporary societies," namely, "how to manage moral and religious diversity." 15 Crediting the protection of sectarian morals as a legitimate government objective, under the right to religious and moral freedom, would be patently contrary to the effort "to manage moral and religious diversity." We can anticipate an argument to the effect that managing moral and religious diversity is only one objective, that nurturing social unity is another, and that from time to time the latter objective may require a society, through its government, to protect one or another aspect of sectarian morality. 16 However, such an argument is belied by the
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Or the question whether all "inherently nonprocreative" sexual conduct is immoral. The political powers-that-be do not need, and under the right to religious and moral freedom they do not have, discretion to ban or otherwise regulate conduct based on sectarian belief that the conduct is immoral. [T]he practice [contraception] , undertaken in the interests of "responsible parenthood," has received official sanction by many religious groups within the community. It is difficult to see how the state can forbid, as contrary to public morality, a practice that numerous religious leaders approve as morally right. The stand taken by these religious groups may be lamentable from the Catholic moral point of view. But it is decisive from the point of view of law and jurisprudence . . . 19 Generalizing Murray's insight, this much, at least, is clear: A belief, including a nonreligious belief, that X is immoral is sectarian if the claim that X is immoral is one that 17 is widely contested-and in that sense sectarian-among the citizens of a religiously and morally pluralistic democracy.
Of course, it will not always be obvious which side of the line a particular moral belief falls on-sectarian or nonsectarian-but often it will be obvious. As Murray understood and emphasized to Cardinal Cushing, the belief that contraception is immoral had clearly become sectarian. By contrast, certain moral beliefs-certain moral norms-are now clearly ecumenical, rather than sectarian, in religiously and morally pluralistic democracies. Consider, in that regard, what Maclure and Taylor say about "popular sovereignty" and "basic human rights": [They] are the constitutive values of liberal and democratic political systems; they provide these systems with their foundation and aims. Although these values are not neutral, they are legitimate, because it is they that allow citizens espousing very different conceptions of the good to live together in peace. They allow individuals to be sovereign in their choices of conscience and to define their own life plan while respecting others' right to do the same. That is why people with very diverse religious, metaphysical, and secular convictions can share and affirm these constitutive values. They often arrive at them by very different paths, but they come together to defend them.
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That a political community-including a liberal democracy-is a moral community does entail that a political community cannot be agnostic about all moral questions. But it does not entail that a political community cannot be agnostic about any moral questions. A political community can be agnostic and, under the right to religious and moral freedom, should be agnostic about some moral questions.
Rafael Domingo and I are presently colleagues at Emory University's Center for the Study of Law and Religion. Our conversations have revealed that we share a religious background: Roman Catholicism. Nonetheless, we disagree about this: I concur in the judgment of Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray and Catholic philosopher Charles Taylor that a political community should not ban or otherwise impede, on the basis of sectarian moral premises, one's ability to live one's life in accord with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments. So, unlike Professor Domingo, I affirm the right-the internationally recognized human right-to religious and moral freedom.
Conclusion
Let me conclude with a suggestion. I argue in support of protecting, as a single human right, religious and moral freedom. Professor Domingo, by contrast, argues in support of protecting two rights, between which, in his "Response," he distinguishes sharply: the right to religious freedom and the right to "freedom of conscience." The latter right, Professor Domingo explains, protects "moral autonomy" but not "moral independence." It seems clear that Professor Domingo believes that there is a practical difference between his position and mine. It is not clear to me, however, that there is a practical difference, much less what it is. It would be helpful if eventually Professor Domingo would clarify what he believes to be the practical difference between our
